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Abstract 
 
Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very 
effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a 
fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to 
predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning 
to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the 
heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their 
performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military 
decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as 
participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast 
and frugal heuristics can be learnt, and are as effective as analytic decision methods. 
 
Keywords: fast and frugal heuristics, decision making, mental workload 
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Training Fast and Frugal Heuristics in Military Decision Making 
 
The difficulties with making good decisions in applied domains such as business, medicine, or the 
military are well established but far from resolved. Whilst influential models of decision making such 
as Subjective Expected Utility Theory provide optimal solutions to problems with known risks and 
tractable amounts of information (e.g. Edwards, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), these 
conditions are typically not met in applied domains. In many applied domains relevant information 
is not known and the likelihoods of events cannot be reliably estimated (e.g. Simon, 1956). 
Situational constraints such as time pressure and stress may not allow decision makers time or 
capacity to process all of the relevant information (e.g. Orasnu & Connolly, 1993). One solution that 
has been proposed is that decision makers rely on heuristics instead of more computationally 
demanding optimal strategies. A common definition of a heuristic is a strategy that arrives at a 
satisfactory solution with a modest amount of computation (Simon, 1990). The advantage of using a 
heuristic is that it simplifies the process and reduces the effort involved in making a decision (Shah 
& Oppenheimer, 2008). A major concern with using heuristics in applied domains where decisions 
have significant outcomes follows from the considerable body of research demonstrating that 
heuristics can lead to biased thinking (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). But more recently, a 
programme of research on fast and frugal heuristics has identified a number of heuristics that are 
not less accurate than complex strategies and may even be more accurate (e.g. Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmeier, 2011). The heuristics are fast in that they can be applied quickly and frugal in that they 
require only a small amount of information, often only two or three or sometimes fewer cues. There 
are a number of studies that use fast and frugal heuristics to describe decision making in applied 
domains (e.g. Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Smith & Gilhooly, 2006), but less is known about whether 
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experienced decision makers can be trained to apply fast and frugal heuristics and the influence that 
this has on their decision making. 
Learning to apply a fast and frugal heuristic is an important topic to investigate for two reasons. 
First, most previous research on fast and frugal heuristics in applied domains has demonstrated that 
the pattern of decisions made can be modelled with a fast and frugal heuristic. But this does not 
demonstrate that decision makers necessarily use this process, nor how well they can learn to use it. 
To assess how effectively the heuristics can be learnt and applied, this study will train decision 
makers to apply a fast and frugal heuristic in an applied domain and contrast it with the established 
decision method in that domain. Second, it is claimed that the simple structure of fast and frugal 
heuristics are intuitively plausible, fast, and simple to apply (e.g. Hafenbrädl, Waeger, Marewski, & 
Gigerenzer, 2016). But this has not been tested empirically in an applied domain. The aim of this 
study is to first develop a fast and frugal heuristic of expert decision making in an applied domain. 
Then to train less experienced decision makers, early in their career, to use the expert fast and frugal 
heuristic and test both the accuracy and mental workload involved in using it within a randomised 
controlled trial. The domain studied is military decision making – an area that requires training to 
support critical decision making in challenging environments (Shortland, Alison, & Moran, 2019). 
 
Military Decision Making 
Decision making in the military is taught formally as a sequence of analytic procedural steps. 
These have been developed from military experience and are embodied in military doctrine 
(Shortland et al., 2019). Although different nations have some unique variations, the common major 
steps are: clarifying the mission; assessing the situation; developing several courses of action; 
comparing the courses of action; selecting a course of action; developing orders (e.g. Bryant, Martin, 
Bandali, Rehak, Vokac, & Lamoureux; Matthews, 2014). The process is thorough, detailed and the 
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emphasis is on applying a rigorous process of logical deduction to complex and ill-structured 
situations in order to develop a sound plan. However, in practice, there are circumstances when it is 
difficult to follow this process fully; for example, under time pressure (Matthews, 2014).  
The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) programme of research developed to explain decision 
making in circumstances such as this. NDM is concerned with decisions made in real-world settings 
characterised by complexities such as ill-structured problems, time stress, and high stakes as opposed 
to artificial laboratory tasks (Orasnu & Connolly, 1993). It emphasises the expertise of decision 
makers rather than their biases (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). For example, Klein (1989) proposed that 
the majority of decisions are made by proficient decision makers using their experience to recognise 
the situation they are facing and recall the typical action for that situation. These ideas developed 
from work on chess expertise as a perceptual skill (e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973), and the insight was 
developed into a theory of recognition-primed decision making that has been applied in a range of 
domains including military decision making (Klein, 1993). To test this theory, Pascual and 
Henderson (1997) coded 60% of decision strategies used during a military command and control 
exercise as recognition-primed decision making, suggesting that it is much more common than the 
2% of strategies that were coded as ‘classical’ decision making. Other NDM models have been 
developed that are better able to explain other aspects of decision making, such as the factors that 
can derail decision making (Shortland, Allison, & Barrett-Pink, 2018). New decision making 
procedures have been proposed that are more aligned with recognition-primed decision making 
(Ross, Klein, Thunholm, Schmitt, & Baxter, 2004), better suited to decision making under time 
pressure (Thunholm, 2005), or capitalising on intuitive thought (Bryant et al., 2007). For example, 
these methods begin with identifying a course of action that is subsequently refined, based on the 
insight that experts generate a good course of action upon recognising the situation, rather than 
generating several courses of action for evaluation only after rigorous analysis. 
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The programme of NDM research shares some fundamental concepts with research on fast and 
frugal heuristics (Keller, Cokely, Katsikopoulos, & Wegwarth, 2010; Shan & Yang, 2017). Both areas 
rejected the heuristics and biases programme which implied that people were irrational and flawed 
decision makers (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Instead they both argued that the tasks used 
in this area were removed from the environment to which people were adapted and by using more 
ecologically valid tasks demonstrated that people were competent decision makers (Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; 2010). Both areas 
share a view of bounded rationality that is constrained by the environment and cognitive limitations 
rather than comparing people to an unbounded rational standard of decision making (Simon, 1955). 
However, there are differences. Whilst recognition-primed decision making and fast and frugal 
models both describe responses to cues, typically recognition-primed decision making relies more on 
cues from experience and fast and frugal heuristics rely more on cues in the environment. Cognitive 
task analyses in NDM research typically suggests more cues are used to recognise a situation than in 
a fast and frugal heuristic (e.g. Kaempf, Klein, Thorsden, & Wolf, 1996). Fast and frugal heuristics 
are modelled more formally and with greater precision than NDM theories, but the majority of work 
has not focused on expert decision makers or taken place in real-world settings. Whilst NDM 
research on experts has enhanced the relevance of the models for proficient decision makers, it 
provides less support for inexperienced decision makers who have not yet acquired expertise. NDM 
models, and the dominant recognition-primed decision making model in particular, exploit the 
ability of experts to identify a good course of action as the first option generated. However, a 
decision making method based on this ability cannot be applied by less experienced decision makers 
who do not have this knowledge yet. How then are junior officers trained to make decisions? The 
current approach is to use the formal military decision making process that is a general purpose 
method that a less experienced decision maker can be trained to apply until sufficient expertise is 
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acquired. But as we discuss above this process is difficult to implement under time pressure. We 
propose an alternative approach: using fast and frugal heuristics that do not require expertise to 
apply. If fast and frugal heuristics could be modelled on the decisions of experts, less experienced 
decision makers could be trained to apply them. This could enhance their decision making and offer 
a decision method that is well suited to naturalistic environments such as time pressure (the 
heuristics are fast) and limited information (the heuristics are frugal). 
 
Fast and frugal heuristics in applied domains 
The fast and frugal heuristics research programme has proposed a number of different heuristics 
(e.g. Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 1999). Of these, 
one type of heuristic has been used most commonly to model the decision making of experienced 
decision makers in applied domains, namely fast and frugal trees (Martignon, Katskikopoulos, & 
Woike, 2008). This heuristic simplifies the decision by using only a small number of cues and 
integrates them using a non-compensatory process. The heuristic searches through the cues in order 
of validity and after each cue there is a binary outcome to either make a decision or continue the 
search. The first cue is assessed to test if a critical value is found. If it is, then a decision is made. If 
not, the heuristic moves to the second cue and repeats the process. This continues until the end of 
the tree. Typically fast and frugal trees have around two to four cues and have been tested in wide 
range of applied domains, including engineering (Cropp, Banks, & Elghali, 2011), medical decision 
making (Smith & Gilhooly, 2006), and legal decision making (Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001). 
Fast and frugal trees predict the decisions of domain experts in these studies as well as regression 
models, despite using less information and simpler computation than the more complex regression 
models. 
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Having established that a fast and frugal heuristic can model the decisions made in applied 
domains very effectively, it is reasonable to propose that they should be used to improve applied 
decision making (Hafenbrädl, et al., 2016). For example, they have been proposed as a method of 
screening for clinical depression (Jenny, Pachur, Williams, Becker, Margraf, 2013). However, less is 
known about how effectively decision makers can actually learn and use fast and frugal heuristics. 
Despite good model fits, it is possible that decision makers are not actually using the heuristic but 
rather a different set of cues or process that correlates with the heuristic and therefore leads to the 
same outcome (Hilbig, 2010). A model fitting strategy cannot distinguish between two models that 
may vary greatly in process but have the same outcomes. To test how effectively the heuristic can be 
learnt and applied requires an experimental manipulation in which decision makers are trained to 
apply the heuristic, removing the possibility that the decisions are actually being driven by other cues 
or processes. There is little experimental evidence assessing how effective this is in applied domains. 
Green and Mehr (1997) speculate that decision makers adopt a fast and frugal tree following the 
introduction of a detailed probability chart, but they do not actually train or elicit the tree from 
participants and so this evidence is indirect. Snook, Taylor and Bennell (2004) instructed participants 
in the use of two heuristics that could be used to predict the location of criminals. The accuracy of 
their predictions significantly improved from a baseline measure taken prior to instruction. Whilst 
this demonstrates the ease with which this heuristic can be learnt and applied, it does not fully 
answer the question about the utility of training heuristics in applied domains. All of the participants 
in the study were novices with no experience in the domain. The study therefore demonstrates that 
knowing a heuristic is better than knowing nothing about the domain. But in applied domains 
decision makers will typically be trained and experienced in the domain and it is possible that 
compared to well-trained decision makers no additional benefit of fast and frugal heuristics will be 
found, or even that the heuristics are not as effective. Therefore the accuracy of applying a fast and 
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frugal heuristic will be assessed to discover if it is more or less accurate than more complex decision 
methods used by well-trained decision makers. 
As well as examining the accuracy of decisions made after learning a fast and frugal heuristic, we 
will also assess the ease of use in applied domains. Fast and frugal heuristics are commonly 
described as intuitively understandable, faster and less mentally demanding than more complex 
decision methods because they use less information (e.g. Dhami & Harries, 2001; Smith & Gilhooly, 
2006) but this has rarely been empirically assessed. Therefore the workload required when applying a 
fast and frugal heuristic will be assessed to discover if it is more or less than that in more complex 
decision methods used by well-trained decision makers. 
 
The Present Study 
In this study, we aim to develop a fast and frugal heuristic of military decision making and then 
train less experienced decision makers to apply the expert fast and frugal heuristic to assess its utility 
in comparison to existing decision methods in an applied domain. This study focuses on Platoon 
Commanders’ decisions in the infantry as they operate in complex, ambiguous environments where 
quick decision making is required in response to dynamic events on the ground. Platoon 
Commanders are typically junior officers responsible for three or four sections, each of which is 
comprised of a small group of soldiers. Their decision making will be assessed using a set of 
scenarios that describe typical situations they face. First, highly experienced decision makers will 
make decisions about the best course of action in each scenario. A fast and frugal heuristic will be 
modelled on these responses. Then, less experienced decision makers will be trained to apply the 
expert fast and frugal heuristic. These decision makers are not novices, they are Officer Cadets and 
junior officers in the British Army. They have been extensively trained in the standard decision 
method used in the British Army during their first year of training both in the classroom and in the 
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field, and those specialising in the infantry complete further training. However, they have not yet 
acquired the level of expertise assumed by NDM models such as recognition-primed decision 
making. To be of practical value, a fast and frugal heuristic must have a benefit over existing 
decision methods. Therefore assessing the value of a fast and frugal heuristic in this sample provides 
a strong test of its value in applied domains as the participants are already well trained and 
knowledgeable about the task.  
Participants will complete one set of scenarios before training in the fast and frugal heuristic and 
one set after training. The decisions will be compared to the expert response as a measure of 
decision accuracy. Participants will also complete the NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988) to assess 
the workload involved in making the decisions at pre and post-test. A control group will complete 
the same decision scenarios and workload measure without training. 
Studies evaluating fast and frugal trees in applied domains have compared their accuracy to 
another more complex model such as a regression model. Typically they have performed 
comparably (e.g. Dhami, 2003; Smith & Gilhooly, 2006). However, no study has directly compared 
participants trained to use a fast and frugal tree to participants trained in using the established 
methods within that applied domain. But given the claims made for the accuracy of fast and frugal 
heuristics, we hypothesise that participants in the training group will either improve or maintain their 
decision accuracy. A clearer prediction can be made concerning the workload. A defining feature of 
fast and frugal heuristics is that they are fast to apply and require less information and processing 
than other decision methods. In contrast, the standard decision method used in the British Army is 
designed to be comprehensive and analytic. Therefore we hypothesise that participants in the 
training group will rate the fast and frugal heuristic as requiring less mental workload than the 
control group. In particular, the mental demand required to apply the heuristic will be less than the 
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standard decision method, as reducing mental demand is key function of heuristics (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). 
 
Development of the Fast and Frugal Heuristic 
 
To construct the fast and frugal heuristic, the method used by Neth, Czienskowski, Schooler, & 
Gluck (2013) was applied. A range of scenarios were constructed in order to elicit a series of 
decisions. The scenarios concerned a typical task for platoon commander – securing a road junction 
in order to allow safe passage of a convoy. The set of potentially important factors in the Platoon 
Commanders’ decision was generated from the training materials used and from subject matter 
experts. From these, a set of scenarios was generated that systematically manipulated these cues. It is 
important to note that an experimental task of this nature cannot fully replicate the complexity of 
operational decisions. Nonetheless, to ensure ecological validity was maximised as far as possible, 
the materials used in the study were developed with an emphasis on the importance of 
representative design (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). The scenarios were developed with a 
subject matter expert and presented in the format typical for receiving a mission briefing with all the 
relevant information, typical language, abbreviations etc. that would be used in a briefing, along with 
a map. Experts made decisions about the correct course of action in each scenario. Multiple 
regression was used to elicit the weighting of each cue in their decision. This provided the sequential 
order of the importance of each cue. The expert heuristic was then constructed by examining how 
well the cues classify expert decisions, starting with the most highly weighted cue and adding cues 
sequentially until adding additional cues no longer improved the accuracy of the classification of the 
expert heuristic. 
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Method 
Participants 
Six expert participants took part in the development of the fast and frugal heuristic. They were 
trainers at the Infantry Battle School, delivering the training for Platoon Commanders. 
 
Design 
A factorial survey approach was used to investigate the relationship between different decision 
making cues within typical scenarios for Platoon Commanders and judgements about the correct 
course of action in those scenarios. 
 
Materials 
First, the most important cues in infantry decision making were identified through a review of the 
decision training materials for platoon commanders and through consultation with a subject matter 
expert, an experienced former Army officer. Fourteen key cues were selected through this process, 
e.g. enemy strength. The cue values for each were coded as either positive or negative, e.g. the 
enemy was either strong or weak. A set of thirty-two scenarios was created using a fractional 
factorial design. This approach generates the minimal number of scenarios using an orthogonal 
design. This means that each cue is uncorrelated with the others so that the contribution of each to 
the overall judgement can be calculated. These were reviewed by the subject matter expert to ensure 
that all scenarios were plausible (Stewart, 1988). The subject matter expert then developed a 
sequence of related scenarios concerning a typical task for platoon commander – to secure a road 
junction in order to allow safe passage of a convoy. The scenario contained information about each 
of the thirty-two variations of this scenario systematically manipulated the cues according to the 
fractional factorial design. For example, in the first scenario the enemy were weaker (reports indicate 
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two or three gunmen), visibility is poor (due to early morning mist), whereas in other scenarios the 
enemy were stronger (reports indicate at least ten gunmen) etc. Participants then rated the extent to 
which they thought four possible courses of action were correct for each scenario. The courses of 
action were: attack; defend; withdraw; call upon external fire power. These were rated on a six point 
Likert scale from 1 = ‘Definitely incorrect’ to 6 = ‘Definitely correct’. 
 
Procedure 
The survey was conducted using paper and pencil. The order of the scenarios was individually 
randomised. There were no time limits, but it took approximately forty-five minutes to complete. 
 
Results 
 
The fast and frugal heuristic was developed in three steps. First, the weighting of each cue in each 
of the experts’ decisions was calculated using multiple regression. Each of the cues within the cases 
was coded as an independent variable and the decisions made about each scenario (attack, defend, 
withdraw, support) were the dependent variables. Each of the four decisions was modelled with a 
separate multiple regression. The R2 value for the regression model describes how well the factors 
explain the decision made and the standardised beta weights for each cue describe the weighting of 
that cue in the decision. From this, the cues were ordered based on how influential they were in the 
decisions. 
In the second step of the process, the expert heuristic was developed by finding the minimum 
number of cues that could effectively classify the experts’ decisions. The mean expert decisions for 
each scenario were recoded from a six point scale into three categories: ‘Strong’ (6.00 - 4.50); 
‘Medium’ (4.49 - 2.50); and ‘Weak’ (2.49 – 1.00) indicating how strongly they would select that 
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course of action. The most highly weighted cue was selected and the modal expert response 
calculated for each value of the cue. For example, in decisions to attack the most highly weighted 
cue was ‘Own approach’. This has two values: ‘good’ and ‘poor’. The modal expert response for 
‘Own approach: Good’ was ‘Strong attack’ and the modal response for ‘Own approach: Poor’ was 
‘Medium attack’. Then, the next most highly weighted cue was added and the percentage of expert 
decisions correctly classified is calculated. Cues were added until further additions no longer greatly 
improved the fit of the heuristic to the expert decisions or they excessively increased the complexity 
of the heuristic. This process was applied to all four decisions to create a fast and frugal heuristic for 
each. 
The final step was to integrate four individual heuristics into one heuristic that provides a good 
basis for all of the decisions whilst retaining a simple structure. In order to incorporate all of these 
heuristics into a single heuristic, only three cues are required: own approach; enemy strength; and 
civilians. These cues classify the experts’ decisions optimally in all four decisions. Table 1 presents 
the percentage of correctly classified expert decisions for each heuristic. Therefore these three cues 
were combined into a single integrated heuristic for all decisions. The order of the cues does not 
affect the number of decisions correctly classified. They were placed in an order reflecting the 
importance of cues across all the decisions: own approach + enemy strength + civilians. The modal 
expert decision for each of the four decisions was then linked to this heuristic. The overall fast and 
frugal heuristic that combines these four heuristics and is presented in Figure 1. This fast and frugal 
heuristic predicts approximately 80% of decisions made by the experts using only three cues. 
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Testing the Fast and Frugal Heuristic 
 
Method 
The study protocol was approved by the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee. Data are 
not available for sharing due to confidentiality. 
 
Participants 
Fifty-eight participants took part in the study, mean age = 24.10, SD = 2.13. Participants had been 
in the Army for a mean of 1.49 years, SD = 1.15. No participants had operational experience. 
 
Design 
A 2x2 mixed factorial, randomised controlled trial design was used. Participants were randomly 
allocated to either the training condition or the control condition. All the participants completed all 
of the measures at two time points, Time 1 and Time 2. Participants in the training condition 
completed the measures at Time 1 before training and at Time 2 after training. Participants in the 
control condition completed the measures at Time 1 and then the measures at Time 2, without 
training. 
 
Materials 
 
Decision task. The decision task was constructed by selecting six of the thirty-two scenarios 
created in order to develop the fast and frugal heuristic. Scenarios were selected so that they covered 
a range of responses. The six scenarios were divided into two sets of three that were similar but not 
the same. One set was completed at Time 1 and the other at Time 2. As for the development of the 
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heuristic, participants rated the effectiveness of four courses of action for each scenario: attack, 
defend, withdraw, call upon external firepower. Each course of action was rated on six point scale 
from ‘Definitely incorrect’ to ‘Definitely correct’. Accuracy was assessed by calculating the difference 
between participants’ ratings and the mean expert ratings. 
 
Subjective workload. Subjective workload was assessed using the NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 
1998). This is comprised of six scales assessing different elements of workload of which four are 
relevant to this study: mental demand; temporal demand; performance; and effort. Participants rate 
the level of demand on a twenty point scale from ‘Very low’ to ‘Very high’. 
 
Procedure 
After an initial introduction to the purpose of the training and consenting to participate, participants 
were randomly allocated to the training or control condition. Demographic information was 
collected then participants in both conditions completed the first set of three decision making 
scenarios and rated their workload using the NASA-TLX. This was the baseline condition, Time 1. 
Participants in the control condition then completed the second set of three decision making 
scenarios and rated their workload using the NASA-TLX whilst participants in the training 
condition took a short break. Next, participants in the training condition attended a training session 
on using the fast and frugal heuristics to make decisions. Participants in the control condition were 
offered the opportunity to attend this training alongside them. Training lasted approximately two 
hours and was designed to motivate participants to engage in the training, explain the fast and frugal 
heuristic to them, and help them to learn it. To do this, the session began with a discussion on the 
psychology of expert decision making including findings that experts may use less information than 
novices (Shanteau, 1992). We explained how our fast and frugal heuristic was developed based on 
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subject matter experts. We then introduced the heuristic for each of the four decisions (attack, 
defend, withdraw, and support). We summarised this heuristic again and encouraged participants to 
commit it to memory. Participants completed a practice problem with feedback. Participants in the 
training condition then completed three more decision scenarios and rated their workload using the 
NASA-TLX. This was Time 2. Participants did not have access to a copy of the heuristic when 
making these decisions. 
 
Results 
 
Decision Task Performance 
Decision accuracy was calculated by subtracting the participants’ response from the mean expert 
response. This creates a difference score in which a lower value indicates a response closer to the 
expert solution and is interpreted as a more accurate response. Table 2 presents the scores for each 
decision (attack, defend, withdraw, support) and the mean of all difference scores. For all the 
decisions, the Time 1 score was entered as a covariate into an ANCOVA and the Time 2 score was 
compared between the Training and Control conditions (Lord, 1967)For decisions to attack, there 
was no difference between the Training and Control conditions at Time 2 F(1,54) = 2.73, p = .10, 
ηp
2 = .05. For decisions to defend, there was no difference between the Training and Control 
conditions at Time 2 F(1,54) = 1.84, p = .18, ηp
2 = .03. For decisions to withdraw, there was no 
difference between the Training and Control conditions at Time 2 F(1,54) = 0.97, p = .33, ηp
2 = .02. 
For decisions to use external support, there was no difference between the Training and Control 
conditions at Time 2 F(1,54) = 0.56, p = .46, ηp
2 = .01. In the overall score, there was no difference 
between the Training and Control conditions at Time 2 F(1,54) = 1.10, p = .30, ηp
2 = .02. Overall, 
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these results indicate that making decisions by applying the heuristic decision method leads to 
decision accuracy that is similar to decisions based on existing training. 
 
Mental Workload 
Mental workload was measured using four scales of the NASA-TLX: mental demand; temporal 
demand; performance; effort; and an overall mean score. Figure 2 presents these scores for each 
condition. For all the scales, the Time 1 score was entered as a covariate into an ANCOVA and the 
Time 2 score was compared between the Training and Control conditions. Mental demand was 
lower in the Training condition than in the Control condition. F(1,52) = 4.07, p = .049, ηp
2 = .07. 
There was no difference in temporal demand between the Training and the Control condition 
F(1,52) = 1.10, p = .30, ηp
2 = .02.  There was no difference in performance between the Training 
and the Control condition F(1,52) =0.38, p = .54, ηp
2 = .01. There was no difference in effort 
between the Training and the Control condition F(1,52) = 0.003, p = .96, ηp
2 = .00. There was no 
difference in overall workload between the Training and the Control condition F(1,52) = 0.69, p = 
.41, ηp
2 = .01. Overall, this indicates that making decisions by applying the heuristic decision method 
is less mentally demanding than making decisions based on existing training, and is similar in terms 
of temporal demands, effort, performance and overall workload. 
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to develop a fast and frugal heuristic of infantry decision making in 
experts and then to assess the effectiveness of less experienced decision makers in learning to apply 
the expert fast and frugal heuristics compared to current decision methods used by trained military 
personnel in the British Army. We created a fast and frugal tree that was able to predict around 80% 
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of their decisions using three cues. After training, we found that decisions made by less experienced 
decision makers using the fast and frugal heuristic were comparable in accuracy to those made using 
the standard decision method on which they were highly trained. There were no differences in 
overall workload between the decision methods. However mental demand, the key indicator of the 
mental workload involved in using the fast and frugal heuristic, was lower in the group trained to use 
the fast and frugal heuristic than in the control condition. Therefore participants using the fast and 
frugal heuristic were able to make decisions as accurately as in the control condition, but with less 
mental demand. 
 
Implications for Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
The comparable accuracy of the fast and frugal heuristic to the established decision method 
supports the broad claims made for the effectiveness of fast and frugal heuristics and extends this to 
an applied domain. After only a short training session in applying the fast and frugal heuristic, 
participants applying it in a realistic exercise made decisions as effectively as a control condition 
applying standard military decision making methods on which they had been trained. This supports 
the findings of previous research in fast and frugal heuristics which have been found to be as 
effective as more complex decision methods. It also adds to these findings by demonstrating 
comparability with well-trained decision makers rather than a mathematical model. Prior research 
has typically compared performance to an appropriate mathematical model such as linear regression 
(e.g. Smith & Gilhooly, 2006). Sometimes a mathematical model is chosen that is used in the applied 
domain, e.g. geographic profiling (Snook et al., 2004) but in most cases the mathematical model is 
not used in practice, its purpose is to provide a benchmark. But from an applied point of view, the 
most relevant benchmark is the current decision method applied by well-trained personnel so it is an 
important finding that participants’ perform comparably with those using the current decision 
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method. This demonstrates the practical value of the heuristic in an applied domain. As the current 
military decision method is comprehensive, thorough and analytic, it also supports the more general 
finding of research on fast and frugal heuristics that a simple heuristic can be as effective as a more 
complex, analytic technique. 
A common explanation for the use of heuristics is the trade-off between accuracy and effort (e.g. 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). This means that a heuristic reduces effort but at the cost of 
reduced accuracy. However in this study accuracy was not reduced, but mental effort was. The 
benefit of the fast and frugal heuristic was not the result of an accuracy-effort trade-off. Instead it is 
likely that the reduced set of cues and simpler binary analysis of those cues were less effortful than 
the established analytic procedure, but the ecological validity of the heuristic maintained decision 
accuracy. The heuristic was therefore frugal. But it was not rated as fast. The temporal demand of 
the heuristic was the same as the analytic procedure. This may well be because the analytic 
procedure was highly trained whereas the heuristic was novel and that with further training the 
heuristic would become faster (Anderson, 1987; Logan, 1988). But nonetheless it is a feature of 
applied domains that apparently complex analytic processes that would be time consuming for a 
novice to apply are highly practiced and therefore are quick for an experienced decision maker. 
Complex yet fast decision making is commonly reported in the field of naturalistic decision making 
(Klein, et al., 1986; 2010). Alternatively, experimental research has shown heuristics may be fast or 
frugal but not both with the balance between these attributes determined by details of the underlying 
cognitive mechanism (Bobadilla-Suarez & Love, 2018). This particular heuristic may favour frugality. 
Overall, the major benefit of fast and frugal heuristics to trained decision makers is likely to be the 
frugality rather than the speed. Whilst this study took place in a classroom setting where there were 
few competing mental demands, this is often not the case in applied domains. The military 
personnel that participated in this study will be called upon to make decisions under considerable 
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demands such as time pressure and stress that reduce working memory capacity and the ability to 
process information (Janis & Mann, 1977; Oei, Everaerd, Elzinga, Van Well, & Bermond, 2006). 
Under these circumstances applying a complex decision method could become problematic and an 
effective fast and frugal heuristic that requires a lower mental workload is likely to be of practical 
benefit. 
In terms of accuracy and mental demand, the fast and frugal heuristic decision method performs 
well. But it should be noted that there are other criteria in applied domains that are less frequently 
used to evaluate fast and frugal heuristics. For example, Dhami (2003) comments that in some 
regards the fast and frugal heuristic applied in the courtroom operated contrary to the ideals of legal 
due process. Durand, Wegwarth, Boivin, and Elwyn (2012) constructed and compared decision aids 
for pregnant women choosing whether to take an amniocentesis test based on fast and frugal 
heuristics. The findings were complex as the evaluation of the heuristic was partially obscured by 
issues such as the usability of the actual implementation and the small sample size, but some women 
found the approach beneficial whereas others were concerned that the heuristic did not capture the 
emotional aspects of the decision (a possible outcome of the decision is elective pregnancy 
termination). For some users, irrespective of the accuracy of the heuristic, the whole approach may 
not be appropriate for the complex and emotional decisions faced in this applied domain. In the 
domain of forensic science, Rossmo (2005) question the application of fast and frugal heuristics to 
the reality of criminal investigation in part because of the serious consequences of decisions made 
using the heuristic.  Is it acceptable that decision makers in applied domains are trained to ignore 
most of the information that is available to them? The accuracy of fast and frugal heuristics in 
modelling applied decisions is only one aspect to consider. Ethical, legal, professional and other 
considerations are also relevant in many applied domains and should be considered in future 
research and applications, in particular specifying when it is appropriate to use a fast and frugal 
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heuristic and when a more comprehensive decision process is required. It is more likely that a fast 
and frugal heuristic would complement an existing decision process as an additional tool rather than 
replace it. 
 
Implications for Military Decision Making 
In comparison to the thorough and rigorous formal decision process that is trained in the 
military, it is surprising that the fast and frugal heuristic developed here, which only uses three pieces 
of information and combines them in a simple, binary fashion, leads to a comparable level of 
decision accuracy. This contrasts with the underlying assumption of the military decision making 
process that a comprehensive analysis of the problem is required in order to reach the best decision, 
but it is consistent with a common finding in research on fast and frugal heuristics. 
The finding that decisions can be made just as effectively as with a formal decision making 
process but without extensive analysis is compatible with NDM research on military decision 
making such as recognition-primed decision making. A difference lies in the smaller number of cues 
used to determine the decision in a fast and frugal heuristic compared to recognition-primed 
decision making and the formal modelling which identifies specific cues to attend to and how to 
combine them. This creates an explicit model that can be trained directly and contrasts with the 
more general prescription to develop expertise e.g. through repeating tactical decision games to 
simulate relevant decisions leading to the relevant tacit knowledge that, as is common in expertise, is 
harder to pin down (Klein, 2015). Eliciting the expert fast and frugal heuristics may accelerate the 
process of learning them. 
However, do experts use fast and frugal heuristics without explicit training? As was discussed in 
the introduction, the method applied here modelled expert decision making as a fast and frugal tree 
based on their choices in a set of decision scenarios. An advantage of this method is that cues are 
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embedded within the scenarios and participants do not explicitly report which cues they use. 
Instead, the design of the scenarios means that the most influential cues can be inferred from their 
choices reducing the possibility of subjective bias in identifying cues. But it is possible that they were 
using a different strategy that led to the same outcome. Hence, the ‘expert’ fast and frugal heuristic 
may not in fact be the same process that experts were using. Further research is required to establish 
how well this heuristic reflects their actual decision process. However, this does not undermine the 
benefits found for less experienced decision makers when they were trained to apply the heuristic. 
The training was conducted on a sample Officer Cadets and junior officers who do not have the 
extensive experience to apply recognition-primed decision making or other expertise-based 
approaches. Hence learning to apply a fast and frugal heuristic was a useful approach to assess. 
However, to what extent can these findings be generalised to a more experienced sample? The 
heuristic could be less effective with a more experienced sample who rely more on their knowledge 
to guide their decisions. But in other domains experts’ choices were predicted better than novices by 
a fast and frugal heuristic (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009), suggesting that this approach may be 
applicable to more experienced decision makers too. Furthermore, given the range of situations and 
operations faced by contemporary military personnel, it is increasingly likely that a situation may be 
encountered which experienced decision makers have not previously experienced and so are not able 
to draw upon their knowledge the situation (Shortland et al., 2018). In this case, expert decision 
makers could benefit from fast and frugal heuristics of key factors to inform their decisions. 
Many studies of fast and frugal heuristics test heuristics that have been acquired through 
experience in the environment (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). The cues within the heuristic are 
learnt adaptively as they are the most ecologically valid and a range of simple heuristics are 
developed for different situations. In contrast, the fast and frugal heuristic in this study was elicited 
from experts and trained explicitly rather than acquired through experience. A consequence of this is 
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that it applies the cues used by experts when making decisions in the situations used to elicit the 
heuristic. Therefore this heuristic is not a general decision making method, but appropriate for the 
specific set of situations on which it was developed. A wider set of fast and frugal heuristics would 
be required to cover different types of scenario that might be encountered. Further research would 
be required to assess the range of fast and frugal heuristics required for expertise in a given role and 
to discover how extensive the number of expert fast and frugal heuristics is. This could be a large 
number, or alternatively it is possible that the majority of common scenarios could be addressed 
with a limited set of fast and frugal heuristics. 
 
Limitations 
A limitation of the fast and frugal heuristic studied here, and of many fast and frugal heuristics in 
applied domains, is the simple nature of the decision outcome. The heuristic quickly leads to a 
decision to attack, defend, withdraw etc. but then further decisions are required following from this. 
Having decided to attack, is the attack on the left flank or the right flank? Many applied decisions 
have this complexity. For example a medical decision to prescribe a drug or not is often not taken in 
isolation, but as part of an overall careplan with several interacting treatments. The heuristic also was 
developed around specific decision scenarios, but it would not be useful in every situation. More 
heuristics would need to be developed to cover more situations and further research is required 
specify how more complex multifaceted decisions unfold from simple heuristics. 
A second limitation of this study was the method of implementing pre and post measures. 
Testing was considerably constrained by the availability of the participants. Ideally, the control 
condition would have completed the premeasure at Time 1 then engaged in a filler task whilst the 
training condition were trained and then completed the post measure at Time 2. However, the 
trainers managing the trainees did not want half of the trainees to receive training and the other half 
TRAINING FAST AND FRUGAL HEURISTICS 
25 
 
not. There was also a limited time slot to run the trial – the training could not be repeated. 
Therefore, a compromise was used in which the control condition completed both Time 1 and Time 
2 measures prior to training. As a result, they had less time between completing the measures than 
the training condition. One concern is that this could have led to fatigue or reduced engagement in 
the control condition in the second set of problems because of the repetition of completing two sets 
in a row. Another possibility is that participants in the training condition could have been motivated 
by the training event and engage more in the task at Time 2. However, despite these potential 
problems, there was no difference in effort between the control and training conditions at Time 2 
suggesting that motivation to exert effort was not adversely impacted by the nature of the control 
condition. 
The military sample is unusual in that they are taught a prescribed military decision making 
method that is applied across a wide range of situations. Decision makers in other domains do not 
use this decision making process. However, the findings are of potential to relevance to other 
applied domains. Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in areas of 
professional decision making such as medicine and law. If the heuristics can model those decisions, 
the possibility is raised that decision makers could be trained to use those heuristics too. Further 
research is required to evaluate the benefit of doing so across different applied domains. 
The aim of the study was to contrast the effectiveness of decisions made using the fast and frugal 
heuristic with those made by participants trained to apply the established decision making process. 
However, it is important to note that comparison with the control group does not provide an 
absolute measure of effectiveness. The study only shows a measure of relative effectiveness by 
comparing decision accuracy between the two conditions. Furthermore, it is not certain what 
decision process was used by the control group and to what extent they fully and accurately applied 
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the military decision making process. Nonetheless, this is a relevant comparison to make as it allows 
a contrast with how decisions are actually being made by this group. 
Finally, although the task simulated the format of a mission briefing, the context and 
environment of the study differed from those encountered in an operational setting which would be 
more complex. Further research is required to understand how these factors would influence the use 
of fast and frugal heuristics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Previous research has demonstrated that fast and frugal heuristics can be used to model decision 
making in applied domains, raising the possibility that they could be as effective as more complex 
decision methods. The current study showed this to be the case. A fast and frugal heuristic was 
developed that provided a good fit to expert decision making using only a small number of cues 
combined in a simple manner. Participants trained to apply this fast and frugal heuristic performed 
as well on a decision task as participants who had been extensively trained to apply an established 
decision method, but with less mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can 
be of practical value to well-trained decision makers in applied domains. 
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Table 1: Optimal heuristics for the four decisions 
 
Decision Attack Defend Withdraw Support 
Heuristic 
own approach 
+ enemy strength 
enemy strength 
+ civilians 
+ own approach 
own approach 
+ civilians 
civilians 
%ge of 
correctly 
classified 
expert decision 
78% 78% 78% 97% 
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Table 2: Decision accuracy as a function of time and training condition 
 Training Control 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Attack 0.84 0.38 0.70 0.29 0.87 0.35 0.82 0.31 
Defend 1.18 0.59 0.96 0.48 1.18 0.42 1.10 0.34 
Withdraw 1.08 0.52 1.02 0.44 1.18 0.39 1.16 0.38 
Support 1.28 0.61 1.24 0.51 1.30 0.63 1.16 0.59 
Overall 1.09 0.33 0.98 0.30 1.13 0.27 1.06 0.22 
 
N.B. Lower numbers indicate greater accuracy / less deviation from expert responses.  
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Figure 1: Fast and frugal tree for infantry decisions 
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Figure 2: Mental workload as a function of Time and Training condition 
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